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Abstract
Dealing with high levels of nonperforming assets (NPAs) on bank balance sheets is one of the
most challenging aspects of financial crisis management. High levels of NPAs can interfere
with both bank profitability and general economic growth by increasing uncertainty about
bank solvency and therefore funding costs, tying up resources and attention, and inhibiting
new lending. One potential solution to the NPA problem is a centralized, government-driven
effort to remove these assets from troubled institutions and then manage and sell them.
Though such broad-based asset management (BBAM) programs existed even earlier in
history, they appear to have become more common beginning in the 1980s and 1990s with
the shift toward market-based financial systems in Africa, South America, and the former
Soviet bloc, as well as with the advent of the Asian Financial Crisis. They were also a feature
of the response to the Global Financial Crisis. While BBAM programs have been widely used,
whether or not such a program makes sense to address a given situation is highly contextspecific, and special attention must be paid to the incentives of those involved. Important
considerations include the political and legal context in which the program will operate, the
nature and extent of the NPAs to be managed, and the availability of the necessary expertise.
There is also evidence to suggest that BBAM programs are ineffective in isolation and must
be coupled with recapitalization.
Keywords: asset management companies, nonperforming loans, nonperforming assets

This survey analyzes case studies that are part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of
New Bagehot Project modules considering broad-based asset management programs.
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-offinancial-crises/.
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Introductory Note
This survey is an analysis of important considerations for policymakers seeking to establish
a broad-based asset management (BBAM) program. It is based on insights derived from case
studies of 29 specific BBAM programs the Yale Program on Financial Stability has completed
and from the existing literature on the topic. While this survey can help inform a decision
about whether or not to establish a BBAM program, it is not intended to be definitive on this
question. Instead, the survey is intended primarily to assist policymakers who have already
made that decision in designing the most effective program possible.
In analyzing the programs that are the focus of this survey, we used a color-coded system to
highlight certain particularly noteworthy design features. Our color-coding system is as
follows:
Color

Meaning

BLUE – INTERESTING

A design feature that is interesting and that
policymakers may want to consider.
Typically, this determination is based on the
observation that the design feature involves
a unique and potentially promising way of
addressing a challenge common to this type
of program that may not be obvious. Less
commonly, there will be empirical evidence
or a widely held consensus that the design
feature was effective in this context, in
which case we will describe that evidence or
consensus.

YELLOW – CAUTION INDICATED

A design feature that policymakers should
exercise caution in considering. Typically,
this determination is based on the
observation that the designers of the
feature later made significant changes to the
feature with the intention of improving the
functioning of the program. Less commonly,
there will be empirical evidence or a widely
held consensus that the design feature was
ineffective in this context, in which case we
will describe that evidence or consensus.

FOOTNOTE IN ITALICS

Where the reason that a given design
feature has been highlighted is not apparent
from the text, it is accompanied by a
footnote that explains why we chose to
highlight it as we did. Where necessary,
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footnotes will also be used to identify any
caveats or additional considerations that
should be kept in mind when thinking about
the feature. These footnotes are italicized to
identify them for the reader.

This highlighting is not intended to be dispositive. The fact that a design feature is not
highlighted or is highlighted yellow does not mean that it should not be considered or that it
will never be effective under any circumstances. Similarly, the fact that a design feature is
not highlighted or is highlighted blue does not mean that it should always be considered or
will be effective under all circumstances. The highlighting is our subjective attempt to guide
readers towards certain design features that (1) may not be obvious but are worth
considering or (2) require caution in considering. Readers must always consider these
features while keeping in mind the contents of the survey as a whole and their own particular
context and objectives.

I. Overview
The question of what to do with the nonperforming assets (NPAs)6 that often plague bank
balance sheets during banking crises may be “one of the most critical and complex aspects
of financial sector crisis management” (Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004). High levels of NPAs
increase uncertainty about bank solvency and bank funding costs, tie up resources, and
constrain new lending (Fell et al. 2017). They can also interfere with the transmission of
monetary policy (Fell et al. 2017). Not surprisingly then, evidence has shown that elevated
NPA percentages slow economic growth (Balgova, Nies, and Plekhanov 2016).
Faced with the need to ensure the effective management and disposition of NPAs,
policymakers have frequently determined that a centralized, government-driven approach
to dealing with such assets is preferable to any decentralized alternatives. A key question is
whether the centralized program will be able to achieve the improved outcomes necessary
to justify the cost and effort (which are often quite significant). With that in mind,
governments typically choose a centralized approach when (1) their troubled-asset problem
is systemic, rather than limited to one or two banks; (2) their troubled assets are focused on
sectors—particularly commercial real estate and large corporate loans—in which a
centralized program could have a competitive advantage due to bargaining power,
economies of scale, or the homogeneity of the assets; and (3) they have or believe they will
be able to acquire the necessary expertise to manage and dispose of those assets.

This survey uses the term “nonperforming assets” instead of “nonperforming loans” to reflect the fact that
while the assets acquired by BBAM programs were typically loans, other types of assets were sometimes
involved. See Eligible Assets under Key Design Decisions for additional discussion.
6
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Given the various difficulties presented by high levels of NPAs, governments’ objectives in
pursuing a centralized approach to removing NPAs can vary. The specific objectives being
sought by a particular effort will shape how it should be designed. Key objectives that often
underlie governments’ removal of NPAs from bank balance sheets include:
1. Reducing uncertainty about the quality of banks’ balance sheets and protecting them
from further losses
2. Allowing banks to focus on their core business rather than the management of NPAs
3. Cleaning up particular sectors of the economy that have resulted in NPAs
4. Minimizing the ultimate cost to taxpayers of the NPAs
5. Managing the political and communication challenges posed by the NPAs and efforts
to address them.
While there are examples of governments establishing vehicles to remove problematic
assets from institutions’ balance sheets even earlier in history,7 the practice appears to have
become more common beginning in the 1980s and 1990s. During this timeframe, countries
in Africa, South America, and the former Soviet bloc that were transitioning to more marketbased banking systems had to confront large stocks of legacy NPAs stemming from prior
periods of government-directed lending, and they founded asset management programs in
response. The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 also gave rise to several such programs.
Similarly, these programs were often a feature of countries’ responses to the Global Financial
Crisis.
This survey is limited to the examination of broad-based asset management (BBAM)
programs and therefore excludes interventions such as the 2008 Maiden Lane vehicles in the
United States intended to address the problematic assets of a specific institution.8 Table 1
shows a list of the BBAM programs studied for the purposes of this survey. This list includes
programs that acquired assets solely from banks that remained in operation (open-bankonly programs), programs that acquired assets solely from failed banks being resolved
(closed-bank-only programs), and programs that acquired assets from both types of banks.
The considerations associated with an open-bank-only program are not identical to those
associated with a closed-bank-only program, particularly in terms of acquisition. However,
these different types of programs have enough in common to warrant being examined
together.

For a data set of crisis interventions (including broad-based asset management programs) dating back to the
14th century, see Metrick and Schmelzing (working paper).
8 Included in the BBAM programs studied in this survey are programs such as Sweden’s Securum/Retriva and
China’s 1999 AMCs, in which policymakers initially established vehicles to address the problematic assets of
particular institutions on a one-to-one basis, before such vehicles were ultimately consolidated or otherwise
assumed responsibility for a broader array of financial institutions.
7
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Table 1: List of BBAM Programs Studied

Source: Author analysis.
As the launch dates in Table 1 suggest, there were distinct periods of BBAM program usage
(Asian Financial Crisis, Global Financial Crisis, etc.). Programs developed in later periods of
usage could and often did incorporate lessons learned from previous efforts. Policymakers
have often cited Sweden’s Securum/Retriva and the United States’ Resolution Trust
Corporation (RTC) as models for their own efforts.
Given the critical nature of NPA problems, the fact that BBAM programs were not even more
widespread merits discussion. Whether or not it makes sense to address a given situation
with a BBAM program is highly context specific. Certainly there are considerations that could
weigh in favor of alternate approaches like keeping NPAs with the banks who originated
them for resolution or using asset management companies (AMCs) specific to each
institution. Such decentralized AMCs were more common than the centralized AMCs
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characteristic of most BBAM programs in the Global Financial Crisis (Dobler, Moretti, and
Piris 2020). Table 2 summarizes some of the main factors to be considered in determining
whether to employ a BBAM program over such alternatives.
Table 2: Factors to Weigh in Considering a BBAM Program

Sources: Baudino and Yun 2017; Cas and Peresa 2016; Cerruti and Neyens 2016; EC 2018; Fell
et al. 2017; Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004; Klingebiel 2000; Rose 2005.
In considering these factors, careful attention must be paid to the incentives of all parties
that would be involved in a BBAM program and how they compare with the incentives that
would exist absent the program—the incentives of the banks, bank employees, program
employees, and debtors. For example, the incentives of BBAM program employees (who,
among other considerations, would typically be out of a job following the disposal of the
acquired NPAs) are different from those of bank employees should NPAs remain with banks.
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II. Key Design Decisions
Part of a Package
As outlined in the Background section, high levels of NPAs can have significant negative
consequences for financial institutions. It is thus not surprising that the BBAM programs
studied were typically not introduced in isolation, but rather alongside other measures
intended to address some of the consequences that can result from NPAs including the loss
of liquidity and the erosion of capital. Interventions such as emergency lending facilities,
asset guarantees, liability guarantees, corporate restructuring initiatives, recapitalizations,
banking sector restructuring, and bank regulatory reform are common counterparts to
BBAM initiatives. Table 3 below shows which of the programs studied were combined with
these other interventions.
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Table 3: Program Packages

Source: Author analysis.
The decision about what to include in the package follows directly from the diagnosis of the
problem, particularly the extent and type of NPAs. A country with a relatively small NPA
problem focused on commercial real estate might require only a voluntary BBAM program,
tied to voluntary recapitalization. A country with a larger NPA problem focused on corporate
loans might also need a major corporate restructuring initiative. A country whose banking
troubles are focused on a small number of systemically important institutions might be
better served by company-specific rescue plans and a BBAM program only for certain types
of commonly held assets, which may lend themselves to economies of scale.
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Of the potential measures that could join BBAM programs as part of a broader bank support
package, recapitalization is often the single most important counterpart. Banks with high
levels of NPAs, almost by definition, face capital shortfalls. The exact need for recapitalization
is closely tied to a BBAM program’s approach to pricing. As discussed in more detail in the
section on Pricing, policymakers must decide whether to acquire NPAs at book value or for
some lower amount, such as real economic value or market price. The former approach
protects transferring institutions from losses on the sale of NPAs and shifts those losses to
the BBAM program. This acts as a recapitalization of the transferring institutions and can
eliminate the need for a separate capital injection program (but can also have significant
drawbacks as will be discussed in the Pricing section).
Acquiring assets for some lower amount, by contrast, imposes losses on the transferring
institutions. Depending on the size of those losses, an institution’s capital may become so
eroded as to require recapitalization. The failure to pair a BBAM program with a
recapitalization measure under these circumstances would likely prevent policymakers
from achieving their desired outcomes. As will be discussed in more detail in the Evaluation
section, an analysis of asset segregation efforts in Europe from 2000 to 2016 suggests that
the removal of NPAs without recapitalization does not improve loan growth or reduce future
NPA levels. The study finds that the reverse is also true—that recapitalization without
removal of NPAs is ineffective (Brei et al. 2020). The BBAM programs studied here likewise
provide evidence of a need to combine NPA removal with recapitalization. Hungary’s Loan
Consolidation Program (LCPs), launched in 1992, failed to sufficiently reduce NPA levels by
itself, resulting in the introduction of a recapitalization measure in 1993–1994. Kazakhstan’s
Rehabilitation Bank similarly began acquiring NPAs without capital injections. The country’s
largest banks remained under significant financial stress and ultimately had to be rescued.
The positive interplay between BBAM programs and recapitalization measures may mean
that eligibility for one should be contingent on participation in the other. Several of the
programs studied adopted this approach. For Mexico’s Fondo Bancario de Protección al
Ahorro (FOBRAPROA), recapitalization was not only required for participation in the BBAM
program, but it also determined the amount of NPAs to be acquired from a given
institution—approximately two times the amount of new capital it received.9
For efforts combining BBAM programs with other measures such as recapitalizations, the
next important consideration is whether the initiatives should be combined under a single
entity/umbrella or split up among different entities/umbrellas, each with a singular focus.
The latter approach appears to have been more common among the programs studied.
Malaysia, for example, established Pengurusan Danaharta Nasional Berhad (Danaharta) to
remove NPAs from the system and Danamodal Nasional Berhad to recapitalize banks. As will
be discussed in Mandates below, a combined approach may give rise to concerns about
conflicting mandates and a loss of focus.

In the case of FOBAPROA, most of this capital was provided by private sources with government
encouragement rather than coming in the form of a direct recapitalization by the state.
9
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Legal Authority
The removal of troubled assets from the balance sheets of financial institutions is not
typically something that is within the ongoing mandates of central banks or other
governmental bodies. Thus, the majority of the programs studied required new laws in order
to be established. One unique exception to this general approach was Hungary’s Magyar
Reorganizációs és Követeléskezelö (MARK), which the Hungarian central bank created
pursuant to its macroprudential policy mandate.10 In Thailand, policymakers made use of a
royal decree to expedite establishment of the Thai Asset Management Company (TAMC).
Uruguay’s central bank appears to have relied on unclear legal authority to launch the
Nonperforming Portfolio Purchase Scheme (NPPS) initially before it was ultimately ratified
through new legislation. This resulted in several investigations by Parliament, the
comptroller, and the court system. The typical need to pass new legislation authorizing
BBAM programs and the added time and difficulty this can involve especially in crisis
conditions may mean that it is worth considering proactively establishing the legal basis for
programs to be created under certain circumstances. This could be done before the next
crisis hits.
An additional consideration for BBAM programs established in the European Union (EU) has
been the need to comply with European Commission (EC) rules on State aid.11 These rules
significantly influenced program design, especially with respect to the price to be paid for
NPAs, as discussed in greater detail in the Pricing section.
Special Powers
As noted in the Overview, the legal context in which a BBAM program operates significantly
influences its likelihood for success. An evaluation of the robustness of its legal framework
is an important step for any country contemplating a BBAM, with particular attention to
whether insolvency, bankruptcy, and foreclosure laws are strong enough to allow creditors
to efficiently pursue recoveries. Sometimes this evaluation will result in the conclusion that
the existing framework is sufficient, as was the case with Sweden’s Securum/Retriva, where
policymakers explicitly determined that special powers were unnecessary. However,
oftentimes countries introducing BBAM programs lacked effective legal frameworks for
dealing with NPAs. This is often the case for emerging markets and developing economies. It
appears to have been particularly true for countries whose BBAM programs were introduced
as part of making the shift toward market-based financial systems. One way in which
policymakers sought to overcome deficiencies in their existing frameworks was to equip
BBAM programs with special powers. BBAM programs can generally be granted enhanced
legal authority more quickly than a country can completely rework its existing legal
The use of an existing authority such as a macroprudential policy mandate to establish a BBAM program may
allow for more rapid introduction of a program during a crisis in which speed is often of the essence, but should
be weighed against other potential considerations such as the need for the political legitimacy that can result
from specific legislative authorization of a program.
11 The legal requirements for BBAM programs adopted in the EU have continued to evolve since the time of the
programs studied in this survey with the introduction of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive and the
Single Resolution Mechanism Regulation. For a complete discussion of these requirements, see EC 2018.
10
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framework, which may be one reason to consider adopting a program. The need to provide
special powers might also weigh in favor of a BBAM program that is fully publicly owned.
Table 4 provides an overview of the various special powers included in the programs
studied. As Table 4 illustrates, special powers were typically aimed at addressing
deficiencies associated with inefficient or nonexistent legal processes for dealing with
delinquent debtors. Often this became most important in the context of corporate debt. The
problem of politically connected debtors was also a special problem in many cases.
Sometimes deficiencies requiring special powers did not reveal themselves until after the
BBAM programs were already underway, making program amendments necessary. Burkina
Faso’s Bureau de Recouvrement des créances du Burkina (BRCB) acquired enhanced powers
to recover debt two years into its operations. Despite an initial grant of some special powers,
Nigeria’s Asset Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) required enhancements to its
initial powers as time went on, including the ability to seize any debtor assets and the right
to access debtors’ financial information.
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Table 4: Summary of Special Powers

Source: Author analysis.
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The efficacy of these special powers appears to be mixed. The World Bank has credited
Tanzania’s special tribunal and its simplified procedures and exclusive jurisdiction with
having contributed to the success of the Loan and Advances Realization Trust (LART) (World
Bank 2001). This success occurred despite the fact that LART dealt primarily with loans to
state-controlled businesses, which, as discussed in Eligible Assets, can be a challenging asset
class to address via a BBAM program. In Malaysia, Danaharta’s special legal authority
enabled it to reduce the time needed to restructure loans from 14 to 16 months to two to
three months. However, special powers can only work if people are willing and able to use
them, which was not always the case. Indonesia’s Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency
(IBRA) possessed powerful enforcement mechanisms but was (1) generally unwilling to go
after politically connected debtors and (2) often prevented from utilizing such mechanisms
by Indonesian courts opposed to their use. Mongolia established a special tribunal as part of
the Mongolian Asset Realization Agency (MARA), but its usefulness was limited by an
inexperienced judiciary. Evaluations of Ghana’s Nonperforming Asset Recovery Trust
(NPART) are split on the effectiveness of its special tribunal, with some arguing that it helped
mitigate the negative impact of a weak legal framework (World Bank 1997) and others
arguing that it was too slow and debtor friendly (Klingebiel 2000). Additionally, special
powers may not be enough to overcome underlying NPAs that are of especially poor quality.
Burkina Faso’s BRCB recovered only 10% of the value of the assets it acquired,
notwithstanding what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) characterized as its powerful
tools. Special powers can also be the source for political opposition. This was the case with
Thailand’s TAMC, whose special powers were criticized by opponents as being excessive.
Perhaps to avoid such concerns, Malaysia’s Danaharta had an oversight committee charged
with making sure that special powers were not abused.
Mandate
The common mandate that all BBAM programs share is the removal of assets from the
balance sheets of troubled financial institutions to incentivize new capital and allow banks
to lend. In every program studied, the government was seeking to clean up banks’ balance
sheets or simply taking over the assets of banks already in liquidation. However, BBAM
programs often differ in what they are expected to do with those assets once they take them
over. Broadly speaking, policymakers generally task BBAM programs with either rapid
disposal of acquired NPAs or the more active management of such NPAs via restructuring.
Considerations guiding this choice can include the minimization of taxpayer losses, the
maximization of NPA value, the avoidance of further market disruption via fire sales, and the
creation of new financial products.
Governments also often give BBAM programs additional mandates. Mongolia’s MARA, for
example, sought to normalize the enforcement of contractual obligations as the country
entered into its post-Soviet future. However, the inclusion of additional mandates beyond
the main focus of a BBAM program creates the risk of conflicts or distractions. In the United
States, Congress charged the RTC with maximizing the return on asset disposition efforts but
also gave it additional mandates, including the promotion of affordable housing and the
protection of local real estate markets. Some observers believe these conflicting mandates
reduced RTC’s effectiveness, given that, for example, reserving real estate assets for low-
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income buyers could increase RTC’s costs while concern for local real estate markets might
delay sales (FDIC 1998).
Table 5 summarizes the various mandates for the programs studied.
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Table 5: Mandates

Source: Author analysis.
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As noted in the Part of a Package section, one key consideration is whether a BBAM program
will be combined under the same entity/umbrella with other interventions such as
recapitalization. This too can result in conflicting mandates. Jamaica’s Financial Sector
Adjustment Company (FINSAC) was responsible for all aspects of the country’s
comprehensive effort to stabilize its banking system, including bank restructuring and
recapitalization. Critics maintain that this complicated FINSAC’s operations (Escobar et al.
1999). In Slovenia, policymakers initially planned to task the Bank Asset Management
Company (BAMC) with both recapitalization and the acquisition of NPAs. The Ministry of
Finance subsequently decided that the government would undertake recapitalization
directly, allowing BAMC to concentrate on NPAs.
An additional mandate-related consideration in some cases was whether or not the BBAM
program should be responsible for handling NPAs associated with particular, politically
powerful debtors. One risk of having a BBAM program handle such NPAs is that the program
could become a bailout for well-connected debtors or at least be perceived as such. As a
distinct subcomponent of its overall operations, South Korea’s Korea Asset Management
Corporation (KAMCO) acquired the debt of the failed Daewoo Group, at the time one of the
country’s largest and most connected conglomerates. Critics have argued that KAMCO’s
purchase of Daewoo debt was politically motivated and contributed to the program’s
underperformance when the debt proved difficult to resolve (He 2004). In contrast,
policymakers excluded the politically sensitive Rumasa conglomerate from the asset
management activities of Spain’s Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF), arguing that including it
would go beyond the scope of the Fund’s mission. This decision has been widely praised by
international observers (Sheng 1996).
Communication
In announcing the establishment of a BBAM program, policymakers face a number of
potential risks related to how the program will be perceived. Acknowledging the existence
of a significant NPA problem could worsen panic in the financial system. Rightly or wrongly,
the program may be seen by some as a bailout for banks (as was the case with Ireland’s
National Asset Management Agency [NAMA]) or politically connected debtors (as was the
case with Indonesia’s IBRA). These risks and the ongoing need to maintain popular support
highlight the importance of developing an effective communication strategy as part of a
BBAM program.
Successful BBAM programs were typically transparent with the public about their goals and
their progress in meeting those goals. Experts and international organizations have praised
BBAM programs such as Sweden’s Securum/Retriva, Malaysia’s Danaharta, and South
Korea’s KAMCO for their transparency and the confidence this instilled in the public.
Examples of programs that have been criticized for their lack of transparency include
Indonesia’s IBRA, Nigeria’s AMCON, and Thailand’s TAMC. Appropriate accounting and data
standards can help improve transparency by ensuring that information is provided in a way
that can be understood and trusted (EC 2018).
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For some of the programs we studied, more specific information is available about their
communications strategy. One key message appears to have been that the removal and
management of NPAs was necessary for the appropriate functioning of the financial system
and economy. Perhaps most notably, Thailand’s TAMC featured very prominently in the
2001 election for prime minister, with the winning candidate campaigning on the message
that TAMC was necessary to accelerate the country’s economic recovery. Depositor
protection was a key theme of messaging for the RTC in the United States and the Deposit
Guarantee Fund in Spain. Given its focus on consumer assets, the United Kingdom Asset
Resolution (UKAR) in the United Kingdom emphasized the consumer-friendly nature of its
practices.
In Indonesia, IBRA’s initial attempt to restrict communications about its activities resulted
in continued negative market sentiment and considerable criticism of the program by
detractors who mistakenly believed that IBRA was non-operational. It may also have
interfered with the work of IBRA officials onsite with targeted banks.
Ownership Structure
BBAM programs take on NPAs in crisis conditions, often where no market for such assets
exists and with the risk of significant further losses. Private participation in the ownership
of BBAM programs can thus be difficult to secure. There can be additional, affirmative
reasons for government ownership of BBAM programs. Public ownership of a BBAM
program may make it more feasible to invest the program with special legal powers.
Additionally, the absence of private interests may more easily allow for considerations
beyond maximizing return (although as discussed in the Mandate section, drifting too far
from a commercial purpose may hinder BBAM efficacy). Whether for some or all of these
reasons, the vast majority of BBAM programs studied were publicly owned.
For the minority of programs that involved at least some private ownership, the reasons
appear to have been largely related to legal and accounting considerations. Ireland’s NAMA
was 51% privately owned in response to then-current guidance from Eurostat12 that asset
management companies that were majority privately owned would be kept off the
government’s balance sheet. Spain’s La Sociedad de Gestión de Activos Procedentes de la
Reestructuración Bancaria (SAREB) had a 55% private ownership majority for the same
reason. Slovenia’s BAMC had hoped to adopt a similar approach, but the state-dominated
nature of the Slovenian banking sector made private participation difficult to secure and
BAMC ended up being fully publicly owned.13

Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union and “ensures the production of European statistics
according to established rules and statistical principles.”
13 This highlighting is not intended as an assertion that private ownership of BBAM vehicles is a promising
approach. Instead, it represents the view that if private ownership is pursued, it may be difficult to actually
achieve in a banking system dominated by the state.
12
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Despite majority private participation, ownership can be structured so as to leave the state
with most of the control. NAMA, for instance, was largely government controlled despite the
51% private ownership stake.14
The legal considerations surrounding private participation in the ownerships of BBAM
programs in the European Union are continuing to evolve. It is important to note that
notwithstanding Eurostat’s guidance, credit rating agencies still considered BBAM program
debt to be on government balance sheets, which calls into question the usefulness of this
approach. In any event, the approach has been rendered moot by changes to Eurostat’s
guidance eliminating the ability to keep BBAM debt off government balance sheets via
private ownership participation. For a complete discussion of the legal considerations
surrounding BBAM programs in the EU, see EC 2018.
Most instances of government-owned BBAM programs involved the creation or repurposing
of a special entity to acquire and manage the NPAs. A minority of programs omitted this step.
Under the Uruguayan NPPS, the Central Bank of Uruguay acquired NPAs directly onto its
balance sheet. In Hungary’s LCPs, the Ministry of Finance acquired NPAs before transferring
only a portion of them to the Hungarian Investment and Development Bank. In Mongolia,
policymakers initially contemplated establishing MARA as a separately incorporated public
enterprise to make it less political before deciding that it should be a government agency
because they thought giving MARA governmental standing would help promote stability in
the banking sector. Six years after its establishment, MARA ultimately became a public
enterprise.15
Governance/Administration
A fundamental challenge of BBAM program governance is that programs must be
institutionally independent given the potential for political pressure, but must also be
subject to mechanisms for holding them accountable (Cas and Peresa 2016). Governance of
BBAM programs must thus encompass both the internal workings of programs and their
external oversight.
The use of an appropriately structured Boards of Directors to oversee BBAM programs is a
key element of BBAM program governance (Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004). Important
considerations include the mix between public and private sector representatives, the
potential role of international experts, and the independence of directors.

This highlighting is not intended as an assertion that private ownership of BBAM vehicles is a promising
approach. Instead, it represents the view that if private ownership is pursued, mechanisms for retaining
government control over the vehicle may be an important consideration. For more details on how NAMA
accomplished this control despite private ownership, please consult the underlying NAMA case study.
15 Despite representing a change to the program, this feature has not been highlighted in yellow based on our
determination that the change occurred due to evolving circumstances rather than a belief by policymakers that
the original design was ineffective.
14
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Table 6 below summarizes the approaches to Board composition taken by programs studied.
Table 6: Board Composition
BBAM Program
Burkina Faso: BRCB
China: Four AMCs
Colombia: CISA
Czechoslovakia: KOB

Board
Size
—
—
5
—

Finland: Arsenal

6

Ghana: NPART

9

Hungary: LCPs

—

Hungary: MARK

3

Indonesia: IBRA

—

Ireland: NAMA

9

Jamaica: FINSAC

10

Japan: RCC

—

Kazakhstan: RB

—

Kyrgyz Republic:
DEBRA DRU

—

Malaysia: Danaharta

9

Details on Board Composition
Not disclosed.
The Ministry of Finance controlled the chairmanship of the boards of the 4
AMCs.
The board had 3 public sector members from Fogafín and 2 private-sector
members, with the acting president being the Minister of Finance and Public
Credit.
Not disclosed.
The board had 4 public-sector and 2 private-sector members. The public
representatives were from the Treasury, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of
Trade and Industry, and the Guarantee Fund, while 1 private-sector
representative was from a bank and the other from a food/beverage
packaging company.
The Board of Trustees included a chairman, representatives from the
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning and the Bank of Ghana, the Chief
Administrator of the Trust, a chartered accountant from the private sector, a
lawyer with expertise in corporate law, and 3 other experts.
None.
The board was comprised of external members of the Hungarian central
bank’s Monetary Council.
A senior Ministry of Finance official served as the IBRA head, and the
Financial Sector Policy Committee (FSPC) and the State-owned Enterprises
Minister oversaw IBRA. The FSPC was chaired by the Coordinating Minister
of Economy, and its members included the Ministers of Finance and Trade
and Industry and the state Ministers of National Planning and State-owned
Enterprises. IBRA also had an oversight committee, which consisted of 9
members, including a former Minister of Finance, the chairman of IBRA, and
representatives from the private sector and the academic world.
The board was comprised by the CEO of NAMA, the CEO of the National
Treasury Management Agency, and 7 officials appointed by the Minister for
Finance.
FINSAC’s Board of Directors was appointed by the Minister of Finance. Its
original board consisted of the BOJ Governor, the BOJ Deputy Governor in
charge of supervision, the managing directors of FINSAC and FIS, and some
political appointees from law, labor, and academia.
Not disclosed.
The Supervisory Board was chaired by a policymaker of at least “Deputy
Prime Minister rank” and included members of the Economy and Finance
Ministries, the central bank, the State Property Committee, and other
“independent” finance and business management experts.
The director reported to the central bank (NBK); the Financial Sector
Adjustment Credit (FINSAC) committee approved assets slated for transfer to
DEBRA and oversaw broader financial sector restructuring efforts. This
committee was chaired by the Prime Minister or his designee and was
comprised of DEBRA’s director, the Chairmen of the NBK and the State
Property Fund, and the Ministers of Finance, Economy, Agriculture and
Justice.
The board consisted of representatives from both the public and private
sector, which included a chairman, a managing director (for example, the
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9

Mongolia: MARA

—

Nigeria; AMCON

10

Senegal; SNR

—

Slovenia: BAMC/DUTB

South Korea: KAMCO

Spain: DGF
Spain: SAREB
Sweden: Securum/
Retriva

7

11

8
15
6

Tanzania: LART

5–7

Thailand: TAMC

11

United Kingdom: UKAR

9

United States: RTC

5

Uruguay: CBU

—

CEO), 2 federal government officials, 3 individuals from the private sector,
and 2 international members.
Four members were from the Ministry of Finance. Three were from the Bank
of Mexico. Two were from the CNBV. The chairman was from the Ministry of
Finance and had the deciding vote.
Not disclosed.
AMCON’s Board of Directors, which was approved by the Senate, consisted of 4
executive directors and 6 non-executive members. The central bank
nominated all 4 executive directors, including the CEO, and 2 non-executive
members. The Ministry of Finance nominated 3 non-executive members,
including the chairman of the board, while the last nominee was nominated by
the Nigeria Deposit Insurance Company.
The board included representatives from the Finance Ministry, the Justice
Ministry, the BCEAO, international organizations such as the World Bank or
USAID, and the chair of the debt recovery committee.
There were 4 non-executive directors, appointed by the government, and 3
executive directors, appointed by the non-executive director.
Members of the Management Supervisory Committee included the managing
director of KAMCO; representatives from the MOFE, the Ministry of Planning
and Budgeting, the FSC, and the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
deputy governor of the KDB; 2 representatives from the banking industry
nominated by the chairman of the Korea Federation of Banks; 3 professionals
recommended by the managing director, including an attorney-at-law, a
certified public accountant or a certified tax accountant, and a university
professor or doctorate holder who works for a research institute.
Four directors were from the Bank of Spain, and the Deputy Governor was the
chair. The other 4 directors were from the banking industry.
The board included the chairman, the CEO, 5 independent members, and 8
“proprietary directors” who represent the main shareholders of the company.
The chairman was a CEO of a state-owned company; other board members
included the CEO of Securum, a Ministry of Finance representative, and 3
independent private-sector representatives.
The President of Tanzania appointed the chairman of this board, and the
Minister of Finance appointed between 4 and 6 other board members.
The Minister of Finance appointed up to 11 board members, including a
representative from the Thai Bankers’ Association, the Chamber of Commerce,
and the Federation of Thai Industries.
UKAR shared a Board of Directors with Northern Rock Asset Management
(NRAM) and Bradford and Bingley (B&B).
Initially, the RTC was established under the oversight of the FDIC with a
different board of directors. In 1991, the RTC Oversight Board was
established, which included the Secretary of the Treasury as chairman; the
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development; and two private-sector representatives appointed by the
President.
Not disclosed.

Source: Author analysis.
Certain programs studied were also subject to external oversight bodies, but with mixed
results. In the United States, for example, the RTC had to appear before Congress
semiannually to answer questions about its activities, while also submitting audited financial
statements and regular reports. Congress also mandated that the RTC submit to analysis by
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the Government Accounting Office (GAO). Early criticism from the GAO resulted in
substantial changes to certain aspects of the RTC’s operations over time, with the GAO
ultimately praising the RTC for having made significant improvements in response to its
oversight (GAO 1995).
In Jamaica, by contrast, a Commission of Enquiry established by Parliament to oversee
FINSAC’s debt recoveries failed to even produce a report and was ultimately denied
additional funding.
Among the most troubled of the BBAM programs studied from a governance standpoint was
Indonesia’s IBRA. Despite being nominally independent, IBRA faced repeated instances of
interference including the termination of its head by President Suharto. IBRA’s activities
were also marred by allegations of widespread corruption, resulting in lawsuits and even
criminal charges.
Size
The programs studied did not generally adopt specific limitations on the amount of NPAs
that could be acquired, although often they were established with some expectation for what
the size would ultimately be. Those programs that did specifically restrict size did so
indirectly, through caps on the amount of debt that could be issued in support of the
programs’ operations. Like many BBAM programs, Ireland’s NAMA acquired NPAs in
exchange for debt securities, but it was limited to issuing up to €54 billion in such securities
before needing to seek further authorization from the government. Slovenia’s BAMC
similarly acquired NPAs in exchange for debt securities, with a €4 billion cap on such
issuances.
BBAM programs must generally seek the middle-ground approach of being neither too small
nor too large given their specific contexts. A program that is too small may fail to adequately
address the banking system’s NPA problem or to justify the effort and expense of a
centralized solution. A program that is too large imposes a number of challenges, including
increased operational difficulties and heightened risk to the taxpayer for programs that are
publicly funded. As further discussed in the Eligible Assets section, although Malaysia’s
Danaharta did not set an explicit program size, it determined an amount of NPAs that it
thought was manageable and then established asset size thresholds based on an analysis of
how many NPAs it would end up acquiring based on those thresholds.
Funding Source
Consistent with the fact that the majority of BBAM programs studied were fully publicly
owned, most of the programs studied were also fully publicly funded. This public funding
could come directly from the taxpayer, be raised with the issuance of government bonds,
take the form of government-guaranteed bonds issued to the transferring institutions as
consideration, or be paid for by the central bank (sometimes with the government later
taking on the central bank’s obligations). However, even some publicly owned programs
incorporated features intended to share losses with private parties. Funding programs
through assessments on participating banks or the financial system more broadly might
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provide important political and communication leverage because those viewed as
responsible for the problem are seen as having to pay for addressing it, but this must be
weighed against the risks associated with placing an additional financial burden on the very
institutions that are weak and in need of rescue.
Ireland’s NAMA, in addition to being majority privately owned, included several mechanisms
for sharing losses. If NAMA ended up sustaining losses in the aggregate, it had the ability to
tax participants to be made whole. The consideration NAMA paid for acquired assets was
also 5% comprised of subordinated debt issued by NAMA and tied to its financial
performance (with the remaining 95% in government-guaranteed bonds). Several programs
sought to relieve the financial burden on the government over time through broad, ongoing
assessments on the financial sector. Nigeria established a Banking Sector Resolution Cost
Fund (RCF) alongside publicly owned AMCON to absorb the losses on acquired NPAs. The
RCF was funded over a 10-year period with contributions from the Central Bank of Nigeria
(33% of RCF funding) and from annual 30-to-50-basis-point assessments on the assets of all
institutions eligible for AMCON (67% of RCF funding). Mexico funded publicly owned
FOBAPROA with 30-to-70-basis-point assessments on the liabilities of banks. Spain funded
the publicly owned Deposit Guarantee Fund with equal contributions from the Bank of Spain
and the Spanish banking sector, with banks subject to a 10-to-30-basis-point assessment on
deposits. Such efforts were not always enough to prevent further losses to the taxpayer. The
RCF, for example, proved insufficient to ultimately cover all of the losses associated with
Nigeria’s combined BBAM and recapitalization initiative.
And as will be discussed in more detail in the section on Pricing, multiple programs studied
contained ex post purchase price adjustments intended to minimize losses in the first place.
Inadequate and/or uncertain funding can undermine BBAM programs by interfering with
their ability to conduct operations and reducing their willingness to dispose of assets that
will impose additional losses. The need to go back for additional funding may also increase
the risk of a loss of political independence. Analysts have cited funding problems as
undermining effectiveness in evaluations of programs including the United States’ RTC (FDIC
1998) and Mexico’s FOBAPROA (Klingebiel 2000). Hungary’s proposal to temporarily fund
asset purchases with bridge loans from the Hungarian central bank violated the European
Central Bank’s prohibition on monetary financing and prevented Hungary’s MARK from
conducting operations.
Eligible Institutions
As illustrated in Table 1 in the Overview, the programs studied include a mix of open-bank
programs, closed-bank programs, and programs for both open banks and closed banks. This
determination would typically follow from a diagnosis of the situation through a stress test,
asset quality review, or some other method. Having ascertained if there are banks needing
to be liquidated, banks needing support, or some combination of both, policymakers can
determine if a BBAM program is appropriate and, if so, define eligibility accordingly.
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Programs were generally available to banks in the relevant jurisdiction (or to failed banks in
the case of closed-bank programs), with some exceptions. Even some open-bank programs
limited participation to institutions that met certain criteria for distress, including falling
below required capital adequacy ratios (as was the case with the bank-oriented component
of Hungary’s LCPs) or failing stress tests (as was the case with Spain’s SAREB). Other openbank programs, such as BAMC in Slovenia and China’s 1999 AMC program, targeted the
largest financial institutions in the country.
Whether or not participating institutions are state-owned can be an important
consideration, with implications for other design features, such as the valuation of the
acquired assets as discussed in Pricing. Given the widespread use of BBAM programs in
countries transitioning away from state-controlled financial systems, several programs
studied involved significant participation by state-owned banks. In Tanzania, LART initially
limited participation to state-owned institutions, before expanding eligibility to private
institutions after the program was underway.16
Nonbank financial institutions were included in a minority of programs studied. South
Korea’s KAMCO allowed nonbank financial institutions, including investment trust
companies, insurance companies, and securities firms, to participate, although it ended up
acquiring most assets from banks. The definition of eligible financial institutions under
Japan’s Resolution and Collection Corporation (RCC) encompassed certain specialized
institutions, such as agricultural and fishery cooperatives. Thailand’s TAMC included stateowned and private AMCs because the country initially attempted a decentralized approach
to dealing with its NPA problem before deciding that a centralized AMC was necessary.
A key consideration in defining eligible institutions is whether to make participation in a
BBAM program mandatory or voluntary. For the programs studied that involved a closedbank component, participation was generally automatic upon an institution’s reaching a
given state of failure. For open-bank programs, participation was sometimes mandatory for
institutions meeting certain requirements.
For voluntary programs, the price paid for acquired NPAs is obviously a primary driver of
participation as is discussed in Pricing. Among the programs studied, policymakers
sometimes also included incentives for participation. One common incentive was requiring
banks seeking to take advantage of the concurrent recapitalization program to participate in
the BBAM program. This was the case for Malaysia’s Danaharta, which also had a multifaceted “carrot and stick” approach to encourage eligible institutions to participate. In
addition to a profit-sharing system discussed in more detail in Pricing, Danaharta allowed
institutions transferring NPAs to amortize the losses over a five-year period. Conversely, any
NPAs not transferred had to be written down immediately. Institutions also had only one
opportunity to transfer a given NPA. Additional tools used in other programs studied include

Despite representing a change to the program, this feature has not been highlighted in yellow based on our
determination that the change occurred due to evolving circumstances rather than a belief by policymakers that
the original design was ineffective.
16
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capital surcharges on targeted assets remaining on bank balance sheets (Hungary’s MARK)
and caps on NPA levels (Nigeria’s AMCON).
Some programs approached eligibility by targeting debtors rather than creditors. In addition
to a bank-oriented component that took the traditional approach of acquiring NPAs from
targeted banks, Hungary’s LCPs had a firm-oriented component that acquired NPAs made to
select “strategic” state-owned enterprises regardless of the originating bank. Kazakhstan’s
Rehabilitation Bank focused on the country’s largest delinquent debtors.
Eligible Assets
As noted in the Background section, the types of eligible assets can determine the success of
a program, with certain types of assets being particularly ill advised. The assets eligible to be
included must thus be defined with particular care. Among the asset types that may be a poor
fit for BBAM programs are:
•

Loans to state-owned enterprises or other politically connected debtors, which can
increase the likelihood of government interference, as was the case in several
programs studied including IBRA in Indonesia, Société Nationale de Recouvrement
(SNR) in Senegal, and FOBAPROA in Mexico.

•

Residential mortgages, which can also be politically sensitive, as was the case in
Jamaica’s FINSAC.

•

Consumer loans and loans to small- and medium-sized enterprises, which may
require too much direct knowledge of the debtors.

Assets typically better suited to BBAM programs include commercial real estate and large
corporate exposures, which are generally larger in size, less politically fraught, and backed
by collateral that is easier to realize upon.
Additional complications can arise if the assets acquired are too heterogeneous or include
too many small exposures to be effectively managed. Finland’s Arsenal accepted NPAs of all
types and sizes, a fact that evaluations of the program have cited as hindering its efforts to
dispose of assets (Klingebiel 2000). To address the concern about the efficiency of handling
small assets, several programs studied included minimum asset size requirements including
Securum/Retriva in Sweden, Danaharta in Malaysia, and SAREB in Spain. In Malaysia,
policymakers established the minimum size threshold at the point at which they thought
they could manage the workload, having analyzed what loans that meant they would be
buying.
Certain programs studied went beyond simply excluding small exposures and specifically
targeted NPAs from the most significant delinquent debtors in the country. This was the
approach taken by Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank and the firm-oriented component of
Hungary’s LCPs. The ability to aggregate the debt of such large debtors and thereby increase
negotiating power is one potential benefit of a BBAM approach.
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One of the potential concerns associated with BBAM programs is the risk of moral hazard. If
banks have an expectation that they will be able to transfer NPAs to a BBAM program, they
may be more likely to extend risky loans. Several programs studied sought to address moral
hazard by limiting eligibility to assets initiated by a given date. China’s 1999 AMC program
accepted only NPAs generated by policy lending prior to 1996. The bank-oriented
component of Hungary’s 1992 LCPs excluded loans made after October 1, 1992. Tanzania’s
LART initially restricted eligibility to assets in existence at the time of the legislation
establishing the program.
The risk associated with being too restrictive in the assets accepted by a BBAM program is
that it may leave banks with NPA levels that remain problematically high. This appears to
have been the case with Thailand’s TAMC, in which different sets of asset eligibility criteria
were developed for state-owned institutions and for private institutions. The criteria for
private institutions were more stringent, with NPAs subject to a previous court ruling or
restructuring agreements deemed ineligible. Given that Thailand had already been in crisis
for several years by the time of the TAMC’s introduction, this excluded a majority of NPAs
held by private institutions. As a result, the TAMC acquired the vast majority of its assets
from state-owned institutions, while private banks and AMCs retained high levels of NPAs.
While the nature of BBAM programs is such that they typically acquired NPAs specifically,
many programs, such as the RTC in the United States, the RCC in Japan, and the BAMC in
Slovenia, also acquired performing loans. This may have been motivated by the belief that
consolidating all of the obligations of a given debtor, whether performing or not, would give
the BBAM program additional leverage and promote more effective restructuring. This was
the motivation explicitly cited by the BAMC. It may also be intended to help the BBAM
program achieve stand-alone profitability. However, there may be circumstances in which
specific performing assets are included for political reasons. Nigeria’s AMCON purchased
performing loans that it deemed too large relative to the capital base of the transferring
banks, but critics allege that these assets were included because a government official was
the debtor (Cerutti and Neyens 2016).
Acquisition Mechanics
Policymakers designing BBAM programs must determine the mechanics of acquiring the
targeted assets. The approaches here are generally very different for closed-bank programs
and open-bank programs. Closed-bank programs typically acquire assets automatically upon
an institution’s failure, often with no need to make decisions about which specific assets to
acquire and what consideration to provide. In some instances, negotiation over which NPAs
a closed-bank program would take on were a key feature of attempts to sell failed banks to
acquiring institutions, as was the case for the United States’ RTC and the Spain’s Deposit
Guarantee Fund.
Open-bank programs, conversely, must choose which NPAs to acquire, as well as the timing,
logistics, and consideration to be used. In many cases, participating institutions provided
BBAM programs with lists of eligible assets that the programs would then evaluate for
acquisition. In Hungary, MARK selected the specific assets to be acquired at random off a list
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of all eligible assets to avoid adverse selection and help ensure that assets were acquired at
an appropriate price.17
The timing of asset acquisition by open-bank BBAM programs can create moral hazard
concerns. Ongoing asset purchases may encourage banks to engage in risky lending with the
expectation that any NPAs that result can be transferred to the program. For programs that
want or need to make ongoing purchases, this can be addressed by limiting the assets that
can be transferred to those existing as of a certain date, as discussed in Eligible Assets.
Several programs did in fact employ a tranche approach, in which assets were purchased in
groups over time, in most cases seemingly to avoid the logistical difficulties that would have
been associated with attempting to acquire all targeted NPAs at once. Malaysia’s Danaharta
acquired NPAs in two rounds—an initial primary carveout and a secondary carveout with
more selective criteria. Thailand’s TAMC sorted NPAs into tranches based on the number of
creditors, institution type, and amount of outstanding debt. Slovenia’s BAMC divided
purchases among multiple tranches, with all of the assets associated with a given debtor
included in the same tranche. Spain used the health of the transferring financial institutions
to split SAREB’s acquisition into two groups, with the most distressed institutions
transferring first. In Ireland, NAMA had to abandon its initial plan of sorting assets into
tranches where the first tranche contained a small number of debtors with large exposures
and later tranches would include more debtors with smaller exposures. This multi-step
process was proving to be too slow. The need to accelerate the pace of asset acquisition
resulted in the collapsing of multiple anticipated future tranches into one final bulk tranche.
The consideration paid for acquired NPAs in open-bank programs typically consisted of debt
securities, often guaranteed by the government. The use of debt securities avoids the need
to provide cash up front and instead allows for payment over time as the program begins to
realize returns on acquired NPAs. This is a concern primarily for budget-constrained
governments that would otherwise not have the ability to fund the purchases. In such
situations, bond maturity should be tied to the lifespan of the program and the expected
timing of cash flows from the NPAs (Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004). Another approach is to use
zero-coupon bonds to delay the need to make any payments until bond maturity, as was done
in Nigeria’s AMCON. If the bonds are eligible collateral for central bank lending facilities, they
can also be used to improve recipient banks’ liquidity position right away. A less common
form of consideration seen in Kazakhstan’s Rehabilitation Bank and Senegal’s SNR was the
removal of NPAs from bank balance sheets in exchange for the cancellation of a
corresponding amount of bank liabilities owed to the government. These liabilities could

17 While the random selection of assets off a submitted list to reduce adverse selection was a key feature highlighted

by the European Commission in its consideration of Hungary’s MARK, the ability of random selection to effectively
combat adverse selection is dependent on the submitted list itself not being the product of adverse selection.
Randomly selecting assets off a list of an institution’s worst NPAs would still leave a BBAM program with the worst
NPAs. Such a design feature is thus interesting, but also to be approached with caution.
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take the form of previous government assistance and/or deposits from state-owned
enterprises or other agencies of the government.18
Acquisition Pricing
A key consideration for the design of a BBAM program, particularly one that will engage in
open-bank acquisitions, is the price at which assets will be acquired. Cerruti and Neyens
(2016) have described this as the most difficult of all of the design decisions associated with
establishing a BBAM program. As discussed throughout this survey, it is also a decision that
has significant implications for other program features.
As illustrated in Table 7, approaches to pricing can generally be divided into one of three
categories: acquisition at book value, acquisition at real economic value, or acquisition at
market price. In crisis conditions, it is generally understood that acquisitions at both book
value and market price are likely to result in pricing that is different from the actual value of
the asset. If an NPA is acquired at book value, the price will be higher than the asset’s ultimate
return, given its nonperforming status. This shifts the losses associated with the NPA from
the transferring institutions to the BBAM program. If an NPA is acquired at market price, the
price will be lower than the asset’s ultimate return, given the market-distorting effect of the
crisis.

The ability to net the purchase price for transferred assets against amounts already owed by the transferring
institutions to the state may be a way of simplifying the process of acquiring assets in some circumstances.
18
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Table 7: Approaches to Pricing

Source: Author analysis.
Both paying too much and paying too little for NPAs have the potential to undermine the
effectiveness of BBAM programs. Paying too much may obviate the need for recapitalizing
the transferring banks as discussed in the Part of a Package section, but there are potential
concerns associated with this form of indirect recapitalization. These include (1) the fact that

68

Broad-Based Asset Management Programs

McNamara et al.

capital provided in this form is free or low cost and therefore disadvantages other firms and
(2) the fact that direct injections typically afford policymakers more control over the
institutions receiving the capital (Rose 2005). Paying too much may also undermine
attempts to deal with the NPAs themselves. If BBAM programs acquire NPAs at prices above
what can be realized from the assets, the disposal of the NPAs will result in large, immediate
losses. The desire to avoid such an outcome may result in BBAM programs’ holding on to
NPAs without any real effort to dispose of them. If acquiring NPAs at higher values is
necessary despite this concern, an immediate revaluation on the books of the BBAM program
may be important in removing any disincentive to disposal (Rose 2005).
As indicated in Table 7, acquisition at book value has been a frequently used approach,
notwithstanding the concerns associated with paying too much for NPAs. Sometimes this
may be a practical consideration. The Spanish Deposit Guarantee Fund, for example,
purchased NPAs at book value because policymakers considered it too difficult to determine
an alternate, market-based price. It is also the case that book value pricing may be less of a
concern where the participants in a BBAM program are state-owned banks, because the state
will be responsible for the losses whether they are imposed on the program or on the
transferring banks.
Paying too little for NPAs introduces its own set of potential challenges. If institutions
perceive the price offered for NPAs as too low and participation is voluntary, there may be
little uptake. This was initially the case for the RCC in Japan, which in its early years paid an
average of 3.8% of book value and attracted few participants. Japanese policymakers later
successfully amended the RCC’s approach with the explicit objective of encouraging more
participation. Prices can be too low to secure participation not only in absolute terms, but
also relative to institutions’ expectations about what prices will be available in future
versions of the BBAM program. Hungary’s LCPs featured both an initial bank-oriented
component that acquired NPAs from targeted banks and a subsequent firm-oriented
component that acquired NPAs made to targeted state-owned enterprises by any banks. It
appears that banks were reluctant to dispose of eligible NPAs during the initial bankoriented component because they expected those same NPAs to fetch higher prices during
the subsequent firm-oriented component.
Even if BBAM programs succeed in attracting participants at low prices (possibly because
participation is mandatory), such pricing can interfere with the effective disposition of
acquired NPAs. A BBAM program that acquires NPAs at very low prices may be able to
achieve significant profits without maximizing the value of those assets. This could reduce
incentives for maximizing value and promote hurried disposal at prices below those that
might ultimately be possible.
The real economic value approach to pricing can be seen as an attempt to find the
appropriate middle path between prices that are too high and prices that are too low for a
BBAM program to be successful. Typically it involves an attempt to determine the intrinsic
value of an asset outside of crisis conditions when the market-distorting effects of the crisis
have subsided and the actual losses incurred by the asset are realized. This can prove
difficult, as was the case with Spain’s SAREB, where a revaluation of assets three years after
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they had been acquired at what was then considered real economic value resulted in
substantial losses.
For BBAM programs introduced in the European Union, purchasing assets at an abovemarket price constituted State aid under EC rules. Such purchases would be approved only
if they met certain criteria set forth in the Communication from the Commission on the
Treatment of Impaired Assets in the Community Banking Sector of February 25, 2009 (better
known as the Impaired Asset Communication, or IAC) and subsequently modified in future
communications. To comply with these criteria, programs generally needed to purchase
assets at their “real economic value,” a figure aiming to approximate the asset’s long-term
economic value based on prudent assumptions about cash flows and observable market
inputs. This resulted in lengthy valuation processes and/or clashes with the European
Commission that often delayed BBAM programs in the EU. For a more detailed discussion of
the European Commission’s approach to pricing, see EC 2018.
Given the uncertainty and complexity associated with attempting to value assets in the midst
of crisis and often with little time to do so, some BBAM programs relied on ex post purchase
price adjustments based on how the NPAs ultimately performed. These could be structured
to protect the BBAM program from losses resulting from overpaying, to protect the
transferring banks from losses resulting from underpaying, or both. Sometimes these ex post
adjustments were done only temporarily given the need to acquire an initial set of assets
with considerable speed. This was the case with South Korea’s KAMCO, which aimed to make
rapid initial bulk purchases, leaving inadequate time to completely evaluate assets. The AMC
consequently included mechanisms for ex post price adjustments. Once market conditions
stabilized, KAMCO shifted its approach to rely on more exact upfront pricing with no
adjustments.19
Other adjustments were more permanent. Perhaps the most extreme adjustment example
was Indonesia’s IBRA, under which banks received no upfront consideration for the
transferred NPAs but were entitled to any proceeds from their ultimate disposition. In
Ireland, NAMA set an initial price for assets based on calculations of real economic value, but
this amount was subject to a clawback feature that enabled NAMA to recover any amount it
was determined to have overpaid on acquired assets stemming from expedited and/or
inaccurate initial valuations. NAMA could also include a clawback feature to protect banks
from underpayment, but it is unclear how widely used this was. Danaharta in Malaysia
included a profit-sharing arrangement as an incentive for participation, whereby
transferring institutions were entitled to 80% of the profits on NPA disposal. Conversely,
Mexico’s FOBAPROA negotiated loss-sharing arrangements with participating banks that
would leave banks responsible for 20 to 30% of the losses on the NPAs that they transferred.

Despite representing a change to the program, this feature has not been highlighted in yellow based on our
determination that the change occurred due to evolving circumstances rather than a belief by policymakers that
the original design was ineffective. In a situation in which initial large-scale asset purchases must be done quickly
without adequate time for valuation, it may be worth considering making the use of purchase price adjustments
temporary and transitioning to full valuation with no adjustments as soon as conditions allow.
19
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Under Thailand’s TAMC, transferring institutions shared in profits up to the book value of
transferred assets and were responsible for losses of up to 30% of the transferring price. The
TAMC and the transferring institutions calculated and recognized these profits and losses at
the end of the fifth and 10th years of the TAMC’s operations.
While potentially attractive in terms of their ability to promote accurate pricing and protect
BBAM programs from losses, adjustments may hinder the effective functioning of the
intervention. Banks may be less willing to transfer NPAs if they remain exposed to further
losses on them (Ingves, Seelig, and He 2004). And even if banks do transfer the NPAs, this
continued exposure could mean that counterparties remain uncertain about the banks’
viability. Particularly where a BBAM program is intended to restore counterparty confidence
in institutions to, for example, ensure their continued access to funding, ex post price
adjustments may be counterproductive.
Management and Disposal
The approaches taken to the management and disposal of acquired NPAs in programs
studied were closely related to their overarching mandates. An overview of select programs’
approaches is included in Table 8.
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Table 8: Approaches to Management and Disposal

Source: Author analysis.
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A minority approach to the management and disposal of NPAs gave responsibility for the
assets to the transferring institutions, either because the institutions were better positioned
to deal with them and/or because the exposures were too small to warrant the attention of
BBAM program staff. Where a primary objective of a BBAM program is to free transferring
banks to focus on their core business, requiring these banks to remain responsible for the
management and disposition of the assets can be self-defeating. Such arrangements also
require careful consideration of the banks’ incentives and contractual provisions that reflect
these realities. Hungary’s LCPs adopted this approach for the bank-oriented component of
its program. Mexico’s FOBAPROA also made use of the banks themselves, and as discussed
in the Pricing section, negotiated loss-sharing arrangements to incentivize banks to manage
assets appropriately. In Spain, SAREB initially relied on transferring banks for management
and disposal before concerns about conflicts of interest ultimately prompted a shift to
outside contractors.
The use of outside contractors or the sale of NPAs to third parties who will then seek to
collect on them can create political challenges. In Jamaica, FINSAC transferred residual NPAs
to an American financial institution whose aggressive collection efforts resulted in
widespread criticism from the Jamaican public.
In some instances, attempts to build safeguards into the disposal process interfered with
program effectiveness. Congress initially required the United States’ RTC to dispose of assets
for at least 95% of assessed value. They later reduced this threshold to 70% to accelerate the
disposition process. In Slovenia, the BAMC was subject to a requirement that it dispose of at
least 10% of its assets every year, but this may have resulted in forced sales and unnecessary
losses.
The need to dispose of large volumes of NPAs often resulted in the pioneering of new
techniques and products. The United States’ RTC is often credited with having jumpstarted
the market for commercial mortgage securitizations. Danaharta was responsible for the first
collateralized loan obligation in Malaysia. The desire to develop secondary markets for NPAs
and new approaches for dealing with them was often a key consideration in launching BBAM
programs.
Timeframe
A final key consideration in the design of BBAM programs is whether or not the program
should have a predefined timeframe and, if so, how long it should be. Too short a timeframe
could result in a program’s disposing of NPAs prematurely in ways that exacerbate market
conditions and/or fail to maximize the value of the assets. Too long a timeframe could result
in NPAs’ languishing in the program and continuing to lose value over time.
As Table 9 illustrates, the programs studied took a variety of approaches to the timeframe
question. Given the potential concern that too long a timeframe could result in languishing,
it is perhaps surprising to see how many programs had no predefined timeframes and were
effectively open ended. The IMF repeatedly criticized Nigeria’s AMCON, for example, for
failure to establish a sunset date, warning that it increased financial risks and the threat of
moral hazard (IMF 2013). Instead of relying on open-ended timeframes, several programs
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studied appear to have addressed timing uncertainty by establishing a defined lifespan
subject to extension. As indicated in Table 9, several countries made use of such extensions,
while others ended programs early.
Table 9: Approaches to Timeframe

Source: Author analysis.

III. Evaluation
A small body of literature has examined BBAM programs to determine which are generally
seen as successful, which are generally seen as unsuccessful, and what shared characteristics
may account for their relative performance. A 2016 World Bank study (Cerutti and Neyens)
compared nine centralized AMCs from the 1980s through the Global Financial Crisis and, as

74

Broad-Based Asset Management Programs

McNamara et al.

outlined in Table 10, identified non-exhaustive “good practices” for AMC management. A
2020 IMF report (Dobler, Moretti, and Piris) provided lessons learned from the
organization’s official response to systemic banking crises across the world and came up
with a similar list of design features of successful centralized AMCs. A 2017 Financial
Stability Institute report (Baudino and Yun) described various options for addressing
systemic NPA problems and the situations in which centralized AMCs might be necessary
and most likely to succeed. In 2018, based on the recent experience of Ireland and other EU
countries with centralized AMCs, the European Commission published an “AMC Blueprint”
with wide-ranging recommendations for EU countries considering establishing AMCs in the
future (EC).
These studies identified many of the same context factors and design decisions that our
survey has shown to be particularly influential in determining program success. Programs
whose NPAs involve commercial real estate or large corporate exposures are generally more
successful than programs whose NPAs comprise loans to politically connected debtors,
residential mortgages, consumer loans, or SME loans. Programs in countries with strong
legal systems are generally more successful than programs in countries with weak legal
systems in which creditors cannot effectively enforce their rights. Programs with strong
governance and good transparency are generally more successful than programs without.
Yet, despite the frequency with which they have been used, dating back to as early as the
1980s, BBAM programs have not been the subject of many empirical studies that seek to
demonstrate whether or not they worked and, if so, what design features promote program
success (Brei et al. 2020). This may stem in part from the challenges associated with
evaluating BBAM programs. As discussed in Part of a Package, BBAM programs are often
combined with other interventions such that it can be difficult to disentangle the effects of
different parts of a combined package. BBAM programs are also highly context specific. Two
similar programs may produce very different outcomes based on the nature and extent of
the problem NPAs and the speed of the economic recovery. There is also the question of what
it even means for a given BBAM program to be a success in light of the various objectives
policymakers may have had in introducing it. The political and legal climate matters. A BBAM
program may succeed at cleaning up balance sheets and spurring lending, but at a fiscal cost
that taxpayers deem unacceptable.
So how to measure success? The World Bank study (Cerutti and Neyens 2016) noted that
BBAM assessment traditionally focused on recovery rates on impaired assets, but it is now
more likely to consider a program’s holistic contribution to resolving a crisis, taking into
account its ability to repay its own debt and limit taxpayers’ losses. The study presented
high-level statistics measuring these factors for the nine programs it examined.
In one of the few empirical studies of a much larger dataset, Brei et. al. (2020) analyzed BBAM
programs’ success at cleaning up bank balance sheets and encouraging continued lending,
reflecting mandates common to all BBAM programs. Brei et. al. used a dataset of 135 banks
from 15 European banking systems during the period from 2000 to 2016 that benefited from
“asset segregation” initiatives. Brei et. al. defined asset segregation broadly to include both
centralized BBAM programs and decentralized AMCs. Brei et. al. find that asset segregation
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without recapitalization has a statistically insignificant impact on future NPA levels and loan
growth. Recapitalization-only approaches, in turn, improved NPA levels but not loan growth,
as banks use injected funds to clean up balance sheets rather than extend new lending. Thus,
neither tool is effective on its own in reducing future NPAs and promoting lending. Instead,
they must be used together to achieve lower NPA levels and boost credit growth. Brei et. al.
also find that asset segregation is more effective when it (1) is privately funded20, (2)
involves smaller shares of originating banks’ assets, and (3) occurs in countries with strong
legal systems.
The effective use of BBAM programs by policymakers requires a thorough analysis of the
specific context they face and, if a BBAM program is indicated, the careful development of a
program designed to maximize effectiveness.

As noted, historically, most BBAM programs have been publicly funded. Given that Brei et. al. (2020) include
both decentralized AMCs and BBAM programs in their study, it could be that the effectiveness of private funding
is a relevant conclusion only for the former.
20
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Table 10: Good Practices for BBAM Programs

Source: Cerruti and Neyens 2016.
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